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Review Article
Benjamin Reilly:* An Elephant’s Graveyard? Democracy and
Development in East Asia
Using Przeworski et al.’s paradigmatic work on democracy and development as
a touchstone, this review examines East Asia’s lessons for comparative politics.
It focuses particularly on the challenges that China and South-East Asia present
for modernization theory, a foundation stone of political science. In most of the
rich world, including north-east Asian cases of modernization such as Korea and
Taiwan, economic development and democratization have tended to go hand in
hand. In South-East Asia, by contrast, almost none of the expected relationships
between democracy and development seems to work. The most striking
anomaly of all today is China, which appears to be moving ever further away
from democratic reform as it grows richer. This disjuncture between theory and
practice is explored, along with other, more positive, East Asian contributions to
scholarship on democracy and development.
Keywords: democracy, development, modernization, South-East Asia, East Asia,
China
Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub and
Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and
Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000).
Few books have had the impact on comparative politics of Democracy
and Development, the landmark work by Adam Przeworski and three of
his younger colleagues published at the turn of the millennium.
Combining broad theorizing, empirical narratives and sophisticated
statistical analysis, it examined the relationship between political
regimes and prosperity at a global level through the four post-war
decades until 1990. Hailed as a ‘tour de force’, ‘the best defence of
democracy of its generation’ and ‘a model for how research should
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be done’, the book is one of the most substantial inductive defences
of democracy ever published.1
Across time and space, Przeworski and his colleagues found that
democratic governance outperformed its authoritarian counterparts
on almost every measure of development. While economic develop-
ment did not in itself generate democracy – an important, and
contested, caveat – democracies performed better in economic
management, growth and investment, particularly on a per capita
basis (a result of another arresting finding, that dictatorships have
much higher birth and death rates than democracies). Accordingly,
to quote their oft-cited conclusion, there is not ‘a shred of evidence
that democracy needs to be sacrificed on the altar of development’
(Przeworski et al. 2000: 271).
The book was influential not just in the scholarly world but also as
a public policy case for democratization at a time when democracy
was surging worldwide. Even apparently anomalous East Asian
examples such as Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia – each of which
experienced rapid economic development under autocratic rule –
had turned democratic by the time the book was published. But
today, the success of China and other Asian autocracies increasingly
challenges our understanding of the democracy–development link
and some of the other political science orthodoxies embraced by
Przeworski and his co-authors. Hence the title of this review; is East
Asia an ‘elephant’s graveyard’ for theories of democracy and
development?
WHAT WE KNOW
Comparative studies of democratization have produced two types of
‘big and bounded’ generalizations: those having nearly universal
application and those applying more to a given region (Bunce 2000).
The relationship between economic development and democracy is
perhaps the standout example of the first category, ever since
(indeed, long before) Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) identified the
mutually supportive relationship between political and economic
development in the Western world. But most theory-building on
democratization has drawn upon Western examples, especially
Europe and Latin America, rather than other regions.2 Asian cases
have been much less present in this literature, and in comparative
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politics scholarship more generally.3 However, as the world’s most
populous, diverse and economically dynamic region, and an
increasingly democratic one too, Asia is in many ways an ideal testing-
ground for theories of democracy and development (Yap 2015).
Perhaps the most venerable of these is the fundamental insight of
modernization theory: that democracy and development go together,
in a mutually reinforcing if not directly causal way. Despite some
outliers, at both a regional and a global level, democracy and
development remain empirically well correlated (Norris 2008). The
relationship between the two is not axiomatic: oil-rich autocracies
and poorer democracies are not hard to find (one reason the Middle
East has always been an outlier). But at a comparative level, the
basic insight of the ‘Lipset thesis’ – ‘the more well-to-do a nation,
the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy’ (Lipset 1959:
75) – continues to hold up well. While the basic ideas go back to
Aristotle, Lipset was perhaps the first to argue that improvements
in material and social conditions themselves generate greater
support for democracy. Since then, the collapse of communism and
the ‘third wave’ of democratization has seen democracy’s reach
extend globally, a process which, despite recent backsliding, has
(mostly) confirmed the empirical relationship between wealth and
freedom across both time and space (Huntington 1991: 59–72; Norris
2008: ch. 4).
In Asia, however, the neat connection between modernization
and democratization receives only partial support. India is one long-
standing anomaly: as the largest but still one of the poorest demo-
cracies in the world in per capita terms, it has always been more
democratic than theory would predict. But in East Asia, the focus of
this article, the challenge comes more from the other direction – via
the prevalence of increasingly wealthy, fast-modernizing states which
in theory should be more democratic than they are in practice.
Wildly successful but less-than-democratic Singapore is perhaps the
best-known anomaly, but today it is China (whose economy has
grown at close to 10 per cent per annum since the 1980s) that is the
standout deviant case. Unlike Korea or Taiwan, contemporary China
shows little sign of making a democratic transition on the back of its
economic one. Indeed, China’s mix of open market economics and
closed one-party politics stands as a resilient counter-example to the
democracy–development link, and one which other authoritarian
states appear keen to emulate (Kurlantzick 2013).
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East Asia’s challenge to modernization theory is all the more
important because of another important if little-noticed trend: China
notwithstanding, the region is one of the few to register an increase
in aggregate democracy levels over the past decade. More East Asians
today live in democracies than ever before, the vast majority in
developing countries. New or restored democracies, ranging from
Mongolia in the north to East Timor in the south, have joined Korea,
Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia (as well as the established
democracy of Japan, and now potentially Burma too) as countries
where governments are chosen and changed via the electoral
process. Despite ‘backsliding’ in once-promising cases such as
Malaysia and Thailand, and the institutionalization of ‘low quality’
democracy in the Philippines and Indonesia, this makes Asia some-
thing of a bright spot compared with the democratic recession taking
place elsewhere (Diamond and Plattner 2015). As Freedom House
has observed,
Over the past five years, the Asia-Pacific region has been the only one to
record steady gains in political rights and civil liberties as measured by
Freedom House. Although it is home to China, where over half the world’s
Not Free population lives, and North Korea, the least free country in the
world, a number of Asia-Pacific countries have made impressive gains in the
institutions of electoral democracy – elections, political parties, pluralism –
and in freedom of association.4
All of this raises challenges for studies of democracy and develop-
ment – and the eponymous book which provides a focus for this
article. A model of both parsimony and precision, the book remains
perhaps the single most authoritative test of the many empirical
inquiries into the relationship between wealth and democracy. In
defining, evaluating and extending the investigation of democratic
modernization theory over time and space, Przeworski and his
co-authors confirmed much of the scholarly orthodoxy: most
importantly, that democracy is sustained by development – to the
point that once a basic level of prosperity is reached, democracy
becomes almost inviolable, once it is established. They also investi-
gated other key questions: whether economic development is
conducive to particular regime types, whether democracy fosters or
hinders political welfare, democracy’s institutional scaffolding, and
the broader social and economic preconditions for democracy.
Their results were, for the most part, a striking vindication of
democracy’s strengths. At a global level, democracies had healthier,
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longer-lived populations, did a better job than autocracies of main-
taining social peace and providing public goods, and were about the
same in relation to long-run growth and investment. Economic
growth and investment, demographic changes and fertility levels
were all affected by regime type – again, with democracies superior
on almost all measures. Democracy and development were thus
intimately connected: once a country is minimally wealthy, they
found, democracy was almost certain to survive ‘come hell or high
water’. In short, there was no trade-off between democracy and
development.
This was much more than a restatement of the Lipset thesis with
better data. According to the modernization school, the combination
of economic development, industrialization and education creates a
society whose citizens are more assertive and politically aware.
An educated and critical middle class which can act as a counterforce
to authoritarian rule is crucial to democracy (Bollen and Jackman
1985; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Huntington 1991; Lipset 1959).
Przeworski and his colleagues confirmed much of this orthodoxy, but
with a twist: they found that the increase in GDP per capita which
presages the growth of a robust middle class does not in itself sti-
mulate a move towards democratic governance, but rather that rising
income levels reduce the risk of democratic backsliding in already-
democratic countries.
This caveat is particularly relevant to East Asia, which contains the
most important cases of sustained economic development under
autocratic rule. As Francis Fukuyama (2013: 5) notes, ‘all the recent
examples of successful authoritarian modernisation cluster in East
Asia rather than other parts of the world . . . most of the arguments in
favour of sequencing economic growth and law before a democratic
opening are based on East Asian models’. This highlights one theme
of this review article: the ongoing, and indeed increasing, divergence
of modernization theory from democratic reality in East Asia. Given
this, the autocratic resilience of economic leviathans such as China
may reshape not just the global order but also scholarly assumptions
about the link between democracy and development.
These assumptions are deep-rooted. When Lipset wrote in the late
1950s, almost all genuine democracies were Western (with Japan and
India the main exceptions). Since then, democracy’s reach has
expanded to almost every region. One of the strengths of Democracy
and Development is that it sought to include the kind of variables most
REVIEW ARTICLE 5
© The Author 2016. Published by Government and Opposition Limited and Cambridge University Press
relevant to the experience of new democracies in the developing
world: the institutions most likely to help or harm democratic per-
sistence, the effects of ethnic and religious diversity, the impacts of
political instability, labour participation and population growth, the
timing and duration of democratic transitions, and so on. Published
at the height of optimism about democracy’s munificent impacts and
before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Democracy and Development thus
represented perhaps the high-water mark of a multi-decade effort
examining the instrumental benefits of democracy.
Przeworski et al.’s findings were widely circulated and boosted
democracy’s proponents, including the governments of the United
States and other Western countries. In Asia, however, things were
different. During the 1950s and 1960s, almost all of Asia’s fastest-
growing economies were non-democracies, with the success of the
Asian ‘tigers’ – Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore – particularly
striking. The most rapid growth in the tiger economies took place
under authoritarian rule, and indeed contributed to the eventual
democratization of Korea and Taiwan (the only two dictatorships that
started with annual per capita incomes under $1,000 in 1950 but were
exceeding $5,000 by 1990). Observers of East Asia’s economic
miracle, not least prominent Asian leaders such as Singapore’s Lee
Kwan Yew and Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad, argued that democracy
was not a natural form of government for the region (Thompson
2001). Some kind of benevolent authoritarianism was better for
maintaining social peace, they argued, allowing meritocratic elite
selection, stable long-term policy settings and faster economic growth.
Today these smaller Asian ‘tigers’ have been overshadowed by the
economic might of China – the rapid rise of which has utterly trans-
formed the global economy and, it appears, the future world order.
China constitutes the single most dramatic poverty alleviation exercise
in history, with several hundred million people having been lifted from
extreme poverty, especially in rural areas, and many millions of others
joining a fast-growing urban middle class. From 1978 to 2002, annual
per capita GDP growth averaged 9.7 per cent, with a 10-fold increase in
per capita GDP over the same period. Since then, growth has slowed to
an average of 7 per cent, still a remarkable number for such a large
country. Over this period, rural migration has seen the emergence of
huge cities, mostly along the Pacific rim and immediate hinterland,
which have increasingly become China’s trading window to the world
and the key drivers of China’s economic and perhaps political future.
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As predicted by modernization theory, the increasingly wealthy,
mobile and aspirational nature of Chinese society saw growing
demands for greater democracy over this period of rapid develop-
ment, peaking with the 1989 Tiananmen student demonstrations in
Beijing and hundreds of smaller protests around the country. The
violent repression and rapid reimposition of central party control
which followed postponed but did not permanently roll back either
economic or social liberalization. It did, however, put sharp restric-
tions on incipient moves towards mass political participation and
even more so any possibility of contestation for political power out-
side of the Chinese Community Party (CCP) itself. While the party has
now largely abandoned the pretence of Marxist-Leninist ideology, it
remains ruthless in its adherence to Marxist-Leninist political control.
As long as the legitimacy of one-party rule is not questioned, however,
citizens are relatively free to complain about other core problems of
governance, environmental degradation and corruption.
As a result, China today stands out as exemplar of rapid economic
development under autocratic government. In late 2014 the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) announced that on purchasing power
parity (ppp) terms China had overtaken the United States to become
the world’s largest state-based economy, a transformation pre-
dominantly driven by export-led growth which has created a large
emergent urban middle class. China’s 2015 per capita ppp income
was $13,801 (on a par with Serbia and Colombia), with a projected
2020 level of over $20,000 – higher than the forecast for Brazil and
Iran, and well above Poland and South Africa when they made their
democratic transitions. Income levels in Shanghai were almost dou-
ble this national average, as booming coastal cities prospered at the
expense of the countryside.
Given what we know, or think we know, about the role of the
middle classes – ‘no middle class, no democracy’ (Moore 1966) – this
should be highly significant for democracy too. However, China’s
burgeoning middle classes appear to have largely acquiesced, and
indeed supported, the reality of economic but not political liberali-
zation. Jie Chen (2014) has explored the attitudinal and behavioural
orientation of China’s nascent middle class to democracy in three
major Chinese cities, Beijing, Chengdu and Xi’an. He found that the
new Chinese middle class tends to be more loyal to the CCP and less
supportive of democratic values and institutions than their income
levels would predict, particularly for those with institutional ties with
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the state – making the middle class more often an opponent rather
than a supporter of democratic changes. Andrew Nathan (2016)
recently came to a similar conclusion, arguing that it is the institu-
tional configuration of China’s one-party system, state-dominated
economy that explains the apparent ‘exceptionalism’ of attitudes
towards democracy in the Chinese middle class.
Nonetheless, claims that China will fall into line with moderniza-
tion theory are not hard to find. Bruce Gilley, who has long forecast a
democratic transition in China, recently argued that ‘as China’s
development levels approach $10,000 by 2020, the pressures for
change will be immense . . . the “markets and modernization” that
brought democratic change to the rest of Asia are well advanced in
China’ (Gilley 2014: 140). An earlier prediction along the same lines
was made by Stanford’s Henry Rowen, who predicted that China
would begin its own democratic transition in 2015:
When will China become a democracy? The answer is around the year
2015 . . . [when] China’s per capita GDP will be between $7,000 and $8,000
(in 1995 dollars) . . . Several scholars have suggested that the transition to
stable democracy correlates with mean incomes between $5,000 and $6,000,
and becomes impregnable at the $7,000 level. There is a compelling logic
behind the statistical relationship. (Rowen 1996: 61, 67)
A decade later, favourably citing Democracy and Development as a sup-
porting source, Rowen doubled-down on that prediction, estimating
that even if China’s GDP growth slowed in 2015, it would still by 2025
be at about $5,500 per person ($12,000 ppp), by which time it would
have made a full transition to democracy (Rowen 2007). Another
who made 2015 the starting point was Zhengxu Wang (2008: 198–
202), who used survey results of changing social values to argue that
China’s citizens would begin to demand democracy in large numbers
between 2015 and 2020.
Well, I am writing this review article in 2016 and, much as I would
like to see it, there are few if any signs of these predictions bearing
fruit. The income level at which Rowen predicted China would make
a ‘full transition to democracy’ was actually reached in 2012, around
the time that Xi Jinping assumed the leadership of the Communist
Party and the presidency of the People’s Republic. Since then, ‘Xi
who must be obeyed’ has launched a major crackdown on political
freedoms and the rule of law, which has seen the reversal or aban-
donment of many (small) steps towards greater openness – in areas
such as village elections, legal rights and media freedoms – taken by
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his predecessors. Today, China appears to be both richer and
further away from democracy than ever, with informed observers
increasingly gloomy about the trajectory of even modest democratic
reforms started by more liberal leaders such as Jiang Zemin
(Fewsmith 2013).
In one way, however, China’s trajectory supports Democracy and
Development’s refinement of modernization theory: the contention that
an increase in GDP per capita does not foster democratic transitions, but
rather that rising income levels reduce the likelihood that democracies
will revert to authoritarian rule. Przeworski and his colleagues thought
that democracies can emerge anywhere and at any level of development,
but are much more likely to survive in countries with a minimal level of
development (per capita incomes over $4,000 at the time at which they
were writing). Once established in a developed country (essentially, at
per capita income levels over $6,000), ‘the miracle occurs’ and
democracy endures regardless of exogenous challenges.
This delinking of economic development from democratic transi-
tions remains contentious and was critiqued by a number of later
studies, many of which argued that there is indeed an income
threshold at which we should expect transitions to occur. Boix and
Stokes (2003) challenged what they typified as ‘endogenous demo-
cratization’ on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Epstein
et al. (2006) showed that higher incomes per capita did, in fact, sig-
nificantly increase the likelihood of democratic transitions once
‘partial’ or ‘unconsolidated’ democracies were properly classified.
Given that this middle category between democracies and autocracies
encompasses the very states for which the findings of modernization
theory are most relevant, this was a significant caveat, supporting
earlier large-N work by scholars such as Barro (1999), who argued that
prospects for democracy rise in step with the share of income held by
the middle class. The reality of China’s resilient autocracy in the face
of spectacular economic growth is thus more of an anomaly than a
casual reading of Przeworski et al. may suggest.
But China is not East Asia’s only challenge to theories of democ-
racy and development. Across a number of other areas of democratic
modernization theory – including the literature on democratic
transitions, the role of the middle classes, the impact of ethnic and
religious diversity, and the choice of political institutions – the
region’s experience consistently contradicts the scholarly orthodoxy.
South-East Asia in particular truly seems to be a graveyard for some of
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the largest lumbering theories of our discipline, with not just mod-
ernization theory but much of the literature on democratic transi-
tions and preconditions finding little support.
SOUTH-EAST ASIA’S CHALLENGE
South-East Asia is a useful test-ground for assessing the democracy–
development nexus, with great variation on both measures. The
region contains some of the world’s richest (Singapore) and poorest
(East Timor) states, as well as a full spread of regime types: electoral
democracies in East Timor, the Philippines and Indonesia,
soft-authoritarian ‘quasi-democracies’ in Singapore and Malaysia,
resilient Communist regimes in Laos and Vietnam, a military junta in
Thailand, an absolute monarchy in Brunei, and even an ongoing
democratic transition in Burma. Strikingly, democracy is weak or
absent in the wealthiest states of Singapore, Brunei and Malaysia, but
present, to varying degrees, in most of the poorest ones, Indonesia,
Timor-Leste, the Philippines and now Burma too – which also rank
low on aggregate measures of educational attainment, literacy,
maternal health and other human development indicators.
Singapore remains a major anomaly for democratic moderniza-
tion theory. The former entrepôt-turned-city-state at the tip of the
Malay peninsula is one of the great postcolonial success stories in the
world today. Easily South-East Asia’s richest and most developed state,
Singapore’s per capita GDP of over US$85,000 is the world’s
third-highest in ppp terms. As a long-standing soft-authoritarian
‘competitive authoritarian’ regime under the rule of the same party
since independence, Singapore is, in Larry Diamond’s (2012: 7) apt
formulation, ‘the most economically developed non-democracy in
the history of the world’. The Singapore model relies on a
combination of strong rule of law with limits on political competition
in a regime model usually characterized as a quasi-democracy or
soft autocracy (Ortmann 2015). This provides for regular
elections (which the incumbent People’s Action Party invariably wins,
with some opposition permitted), but with judicially enforced defa-
mation action routinely used to cow too-vocal critics of the
government.
Malaysia too uses the courts and particularly the Sedition Act of
1948 to maintain incumbent control. With a 2015 per capita GDP of
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over $25,000 in ppp terms, Malaysia has a higher income than most
third-wave countries did when they made their transitions to
democracy. As Diamond notes,
Malaysia’s score on the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) – which,
in measuring not only per capita income but also levels of health and edu-
cation, is arguably a truer measure of development – is now significantly
higher than the levels in Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and even Hungary, Poland,
and Ukraine when they made their respective transitions to democracy. From
the standpoint of modernization theory, then, Malaysia is also ripe for a
democratic transition. (Diamond 2012: 12)
But theory has again been confounded. As in China, a hoped-for
reformist leader in Prime Minister Najib Razak has proved to be
anything but, clamping down on civil liberties and jailing opponents to
maintain the regime’s grip on power as his popularity has crumbled.
Both Singapore and Malaysia thus represent apparently resilient
counter-cases in which high levels of human development and
government capacity are combined with illiberal, quasi-democratic
politics – and which, in Malaysia, is becoming more repressive over
time. As standout examples of ‘competitive authoritarianism’
(Levitsky and Way 2010), both allow opposition contestation in
elections without ever experiencing a change of government. Rather,
dominant governing parties use electoral gerrymandering, compliant
judiciaries and colonial-era internal security acts to buttress their
incumbency. Critics of the government are routinely prosecuted in
defamation actions which stifle freedom of expression and sap the
energy of even relatively benign opposition voices.
While the resilience of such cases undermines the claims of
democratic modernization theory, other Asian examples suggest
alternative routes to democratic development. In some cases, what
were once Asia’s strongest authoritarian parties embraced demo-
cratization as a means to stay in power. By conceding democratic
openings to rising actors at times of high political uncertainty, adept
ruling parties can increase their prospects in the post-authoritarian
polity. Dan Slater and Joe Wong argue that this scenario has played
out, albeit in very different ways, in at least three Asian develop-
mental states where ruling parties have democratized from positions
of strength: Taiwan, South Korea and (more questionably) Indone-
sia. In such cases, the declining popularity of long-ruling hegemonic
parties saw them open up space for opposition movements, but also
allowed them a route back to power (Slater and Wong 2013).
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Other scholars see ‘electorally led’ democratization as a more
viable model of transition from authoritarian rule, claiming that
holding repeated elections over time, even in less than open political
environments, can itself promote democratic prospects (Lindberg
2009). While the idea of ‘democratization by elections’ is under-
mined by Singapore and Malaysia, the recent experience of Burma
does provide some support. There, the process of reform which
culminated in the 2015 transition was clearly scaffolded by elections –
not just the 2015 polls but also prior, partial and less than competitive
elections in 2010 and 2012, which while a long way from free and fair
did, it is now clear, contribute to meaningful democratic progress.
The political openings that have occurred since show how flawed but
partially competitive elections can themselves lead to greater
democratization.
The tightly controlled 2010 elections, the first in Burma for
20 years, followed an incumbent-led process of constitutional change
which guaranteed, among other things, a permanent role for the
armed forces in Burma’s legislature and government. These elections
were only marginally competitive, with the opposition National
League for Democracy (NLD) barred from competing and their
leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, still under house arrest. The ruling junta’s
Union Solidarity and Development Party won a tainted victory, but
these elections also brought new ethnic and minority parties into
parliament for the first time and kept momentum for further
progress. By-elections held in 2012, following further liberalization,
were dominated by the NLD and saw Suu Kyi elected for the first
time. This made more credible the government’s commitment to
hold national elections in 2015 and encouraged opposition groups
to commit to the electoral process rather than pursue extra-
constitutional avenues.
The November 2015 elections, when they came, proved to be a
watershed. Amidst intense international interest and expectations,
the NLD secured an overwhelming victory, winning 80 per cent of
available seats and catapulting a party of ex-political prisoners and
protesters into government. As Burma’s first genuinely open
elections in over 50 years, they presaged one of the most dramatic
shifts from autocratic to democratic rule seen anywhere in East Asia.
But even with its overwhelming victory, the NLD still has to cope with
numerous constitutional impediments bequeathed by the former
junta – including the military’s ongoing grip on a quarter of
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legislative seats, contrived citizenship restrictions on the presidency
(aimed directly at Suu Kyi) and a cumbersome mixed presidential–
military governance structure.
For political scientists who believe in rational actor models of pol-
itics, Burma also offers an unexplained puzzle: why did the incumbent
regime agree to free elections which they surely knew they would lose?
And why did the military also acquiesce to the diminution of power
inherent in the change of government? After all, we assume that
politicians are rational office-seekers, not turkeys voting for Christmas.
But the regime’s willingness to hold free elections has seen most of
their recent leadership now out of office. Even taking into account
international pressure from not just Western states but also their
ASEAN neighbours, this appears to be a rare case of self-abnegating
leadership from a departing autocratic regime.
This flouting of rational actor models is not the least of the
challenges South-East Asia presents to democratic theory. Take, for
instance, the question of ethnic, religious, linguistic or other forms of
social diversity, which have long been considered a challenge for
successful democratization – and indeed broader modernization too.
Democracy is often held to be more likely in smaller, more homo-
geneous states than in large, diverse ones (Dahl and Tufte 1973). It is
thought to be particularly problematic in highly diverse societies with
deep ethnic or cultural divisions (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972), and
less than compatible with some kinds of religions, particularly Islam,
due to the difficulty in separating church and state under Islamic law
(Barro 1999; Huntington 1991).
While Przeworski and his colleagues found supporting evidence
for most of these democratic ‘preconditions’ globally, they fail
dismally in South-East Asia. The region’s standout democracy,
Indonesia, is a Muslim-majority country of over 250 million people,
spread over thousands of islands with hundreds of different ethno-
linguistic groups. Like its democratic neighbours, the Philippines and
East Timor, it combines national-level electoral democracy with deep
social and religious divisions, widespread poverty and acute chal-
lenges of national governance. Burma too is an ethnic kaleidoscope,
with seven ethnic states, over 100 official ethnic minorities and a
multitude of identity schisms (including an increasingly deep divide
between the Buddhist majority and the Muslim minority, particularly
the Rohinga), and a long and ongoing history of minority ethnic
insurgency.
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These four South-East Asian democracies thus counter much con-
ventional political science wisdom. All are ethnically fragmented,
despite the scholarly consensus that such divisions make democracy
more difficult. All are under-developed, with poor HDI indicators and
per capita GDP well below that of China, Thailand and even Mongolia.
All combine presidential or semi-presidential systems of government,
despite the well-known problems of this model (Gerring et al. 2005;
Linz 1990). Indeed, most of East Asia’s newest democracies (Taiwan,
Mongolia, East Timor and now Burma) have adopted variants of semi-
presidentialism, despite what Elgie and Moestrup (2007: 237) char-
acterize as the ‘consensus that young democracies should avoid this
type of institutional arrangement as the in-built conflict between pre-
sident and prime minister may damage the prospects for successful
democratization’ – highlighting again the region’s divergence from the
expectations of the political science literature.5
Perhaps the most important anomaly of all concerns the attitude of
the region’s middle classes towards democracy. Experts on
Singapore and Malaysia have long decried the quiescent and apathetic
attitude displayed by most of the middle class in the face of flagrant
rigging of the democratic rulebook by incumbents (Case 2002). Even
in genuine democracies, there is increasing evidence that South-East
Asia’s middle classes are less committed to democracy than political
theory would have us believe (Dore et al. 2014). In Thailand, for
instance, the Bangkok-based elite have confounded democratic theory
by showing themselves to be actively hostile to majority rule, both
before and after the military coup of 2006 (Jones 2005). Particularly
since Thaksin Shinawatra rewrote the rule book for winning elected
office, the Thai middle classes’ distaste for majority rule has been on
full display, at one stage occupying the main airport to campaign
against the elected government and demonstrating repeatedly against
one-man, one-vote democracy. Combined with evidence from China
discussed earlier, this raises real questions for assumptions that the
middle class will promote or at least support democracy. Increasingly
in East Asia, this does not appear to be consistent with the facts.
A DIFFERENT APPROACH
Taken together, then, it is clear that East Asia challenges some well-
worn scholarly findings about democracy and development. So far, so
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disappointing for political science. But these are mostly negative
findings, dogs that did not bark. What positive contributions can
East Asia make to our theoretical and empirical understanding of the
democracy–development relationship?
One emerging stream of the scholarly literature that does attempt
to grapple directly with this question can be found at the intersection
of political science and economics, again with the South-East Asian
experience central. In this literature, political regime type appears to
be less important to economic outcomes than the particular political
institutions adopted by new democracies. Because they influence
both the electoral incentives facing politicians and the broader shape
of a country’s party system, these institutional choices – electoral
systems, party laws, executive structures and the like – can directly
influence the public goods and policies needed ‘to get growth going’
(Rock 2013).
Some economists argue that countries with centralized executives,
majoritarian elections and integrated party systems will both theo-
retically and empirically economically out-perform those with pro-
portional elections and more fragmented executive and party systems
(Persson and Tabellini 2000, 2005).6 Likewise, the ‘developmental
state’ literature on the optimum political arrangements for economic
reform in new democracies cite the benefits of aggregative political
institutions, majoritarian electoral processes and broad ‘catch-all’
parties or coalitions (Haggard and Kaufman 1995). My own work has
shown how many East Asian states have followed this path as part of a
deliberate exercise in political engineering (Reilly 2006). Indeed, the
combination of plurality or mixed-member majoritarian electoral
systems, limits on party fragmentation, and stability-inducing execu-
tive formation rules is so strong that it can be said to constitute a
distinctive ‘Asian model’ of democratic design (Reilly 2007).
What have been the policy effects of these reforms? With both elite
and public opinion in Asia focused on the need for ‘pro-development’
politics, active efforts to promote more centrist and stable govern-
ment have been widespread, via electoral reform (as in Japan),
constitutional change (as in Thailand or the Philippines) or political
party laws (as in Indonesia). Such reforms typically seek to encourage
more stable and cohesive politics and better governance than was
previously the case. In Japan, for example, former Liberal Demo-
cratic Party (LDP) Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa argued that
reformed electoral laws and the development of a two-party system
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was necessary for the country’s long-term survival (Sakamoto 1999).
Similarly, former Indonesian president Megawati and other national
leaders argued that limitations on party proliferation were necessary
to protect Indonesia’s national integrity and prospects for develop-
ment (Hillman 2010). Thai reformers too saw political reform as key
to their country’s economic revival following the devastating 1997
Asian economic crisis (MacIntyre 2003).
What have been the effects of this shift towards an ‘Asian model’ of
majoritarian electoral democracy? At the country level, studies have
highlighted impacts in the shape of more programmatic policy
offerings in cases as diverse as Japan (where electoral reform has led
to a decline in particularism), Taiwan (looking at the Kuomintang’s
median voter strategy on the national identity question), Thailand
(in relation to health policy) and, most recently, in relation to
pro-poor initiatives in Indonesia as well.7 These case studies lend
credence to the theoretical insight that reforms to electoral and party
systems can have public policy consequences with flow-on impacts for
economic development, as incentives for political elites to deliver
particularistic policies are supplanted by the need to deliver broader
public goods to the electorate as a whole.
What about the specific issue of democracy and development? The
most comprehensive comparative investigation of the economic
impacts of democratic reform has been conducted by Rock (2013),
who tested the implications of political reform across 11 East Asian
democratic and autocratic polities — Cambodia, China, Indonesia,
South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan,
Thailand and Vietnam. Using regression analysis, he found that there
was no trade-off between growth and democracy for those newly
democratic states which adopted the ‘Asian model’ of aggregative
and majoritarian institutions, in comparison to the growth rates of
the autocracies such as China, Laos and Vietnam or semi-
democracies such as Singapore and Malaysia. As a result, Rock
(2013: 1) found that ‘the contribution to growth from majoritarian
democratic institutions in East Asia is as large as that from the
region’s developmentally oriented authoritarian governments’.
The specific mixture of institutions Rock investigated were those
I identified as key to political engineering in Asia: majoritarian
electoral systems, stable and insulated executives and consolidated
party systems. Rock (2013: 18) found that ‘when it comes to the
impact of political institutions on growth, the devil really is in
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the details’: it was these kinds of reforms, more than macro-level
regime distinctions, that were key to politicians appealing to broader
groups of the electorate and delivering growth-promoting policies.
Those democratizing states which adopted more majoritarian
reforms were able to sustain the pro-growth coalitions initially
developed by autocratic governments, whereas other institutional
configurations (including, surprisingly, semi-democracy and mea-
sures of the quality of democracy) were less successful – suggesting
that ‘East Asia’s majoritarian democracies are as growth enhancing as
the region’s developmental autocracies’ (Rock 2013: 14).
Asia’s political engineering strategies were animated, above all, by
the search for political stability and economic growth, making their
experience particularly important for the democracy–development
debate. Small variations in democratic forms can and did have big
policy consequences. Indonesia’s post-Suharto party reforms, for
instance, advantaged large nationally focused parties of government
and blocked smaller regional parties – a move which ‘prevented
Indonesia’s national institutions from becoming a battleground for
organized regional and ethnic interests, and limited the extent to which
local institutions can be captured by ethnically exclusivist movements’
(Aspinall 2010: 26). Under such circumstances, it is too costly and
insufficiently electorally rewarding to try to deliver private or club goods
to localized bases of voter support. Rather, a more efficient strategy is to
deliver broad-based public goods – in the shape of policy, not pork – to
broad social groups as a means of securing voter support (Keefer 2011).
CONCLUSION
The conclusion to Democracy and Development observed that ‘because
China and India add up to one-half of us, they deserve special
attention’ (Przeworski et al. 2000: 272), noting that despite one being
a democracy and the other a dictatorship, they had almost equivalent
per capita income levels in 1990, the final year of that study. Today,
25 years later, China’s income levels are more than twice India’s, and
its system of competitive markets and closed politics appears far more
secure than it did in 1990 too, raising difficult questions for those
who believe that democracy and development will run in parallel.
Nonetheless, China’s leaders clearly do not feel secure and are
looking for ways to further entrench their system. In particular,
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Chinese officials have closely studied the success of Singapore, the
only country in the region to achieve advanced economic indus-
trialization without undergoing substantial political liberalization.
The key lesson that China seeks to learn is how to combine author-
itarian rule with ‘good governance’ under some form of meritocratic
one-party rule. In reality, as Ortmann and Thompson (2016) observe,
the Chinese misread the Singapore experience, focusing on its more
repressive elements without sufficient attention to the rule of law and
free (if not fair) elections in allowing most if not all liberties to be
protected and some opposition to the ruling party, both impossible
in China.
The extreme differentials between a continent-sized ancient
empire of over a billion people and a small city-state just 50 years old
also makes genuine lesson-learning difficult. Unlikely as it may seem, a
better South-East Asian comparison for China may be Indonesia – a
large, complex and unruly country which nevertheless managed to
make a successful transition from autocratic to democratic rule with-
out losing its territorial integrity (the departure of East Timor aside),
experiencing social revolution (although Suharto’s fall in 1998 did see
large-scale riots in Jakarta and elsewhere) or upending the constitu-
tion (which has been successively reformed rather than being
replaced). Indonesia’s reformers also managed to ease the military out
of parliament, where they had been given a quarter of all seats by
former General Suharto, and back to barracks, where they remain.
With its unitary but decentralized presidential model, Indonesia’s
political architecture may be relevant for a more democratic China at
some stage in the future. This is particularly the case in terms of its
management of political pluralism. Any move towards a more
democratic China would confront similar issues to those Indonesia
faced in 1999: how to create a competitive party system but avoid the
dangers of fragmentation, ethnic mobilization and separatism. As in
China, order, stability and national integrity were paramount
concerns for Indonesia’s political leaders. Their choice to allow party
formation but also restrict electoral competition only to those parties
able to demonstrate a nationwide organizational basis across
Indonesia’s 3,000-mile long archipelago made potentially separatist
parties unviable. Combined with laws requiring broad cross-national
support for presidential candidates, and an electoral system that
helps larger parties more than small ones, the effects of these
‘centripetal’ rules has been to limit political fragmentation and
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create a more nationally focused political system than would other-
wise have been the case (Reilly 2016).
For now, Xi Jinping has dismissed the whole concept of compe-
titive elections as ‘Western ideas’ (although he has also committed to
the goal of ‘democracy with Chinese characteristics’ by 2049, a date
both weirdly specific and utterly distant). Any moves in a more
democratic direction, even reinvigoration of the now-stalled political
openings at the rural and village level, would of course be welcome.
More ambitious steps in the Singapore direction of limited electoral
competition would be a huge advance, providing a safety valve for
social unrest and injecting some real, if conscribed, political
accountability. There is no sign of anything like this happening at
present – but the lesson from most, if not all, of the democratic
modernization literature is that China will, sooner rather than later,
need some concessions towards liberalism if it is to continue to
develop. However, it is also true that such statements have been made
many times before and, given Asia’s habit of challenging key political
science orthodoxies, it will not surprise if China continues to do so.
NOTES
1 These quotes are from the back cover of the paperback edition.
2 These include Linz and Stepan (1978, 1996), Linz and Valenzuela (1994), O’Donnell
et al. (1986) and Rustow (1970).
3 One study found that almost 70 per cent of all articles in the major comparative
politics journals are focused on Europe or Latin America, with ‘strikingly few articles
on populous regions such as Southeast Asia and South Asia’ (Munck and Snyder
2007: 10).
4 www.freedomhouse.org, accessed 26 January 2014.
5 A subject I cover in more detail in Reilly (2013).
6 Their arguments are complex but focus on the importance of accountability being
accentuated by the presence of well-institutionalized parties which can be held
accountable for their policies. By contrast, proportional electoral rules and
parliamentary governments lean towards representativeness over efficiency since such
governments are often burdened with holding together heterogeneous coalitions.
7 See respectively Hsieh (2008), Noble (2010), Rock (2015) and Selway (2011, 2015).
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